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ARTICLE 
 
Big Things In Small Packages: Evaluating the 
City of Berkeley’s Nanotechnology Ordinance 
Effectiveness as a Model of Targeted 
Transparency 
DREW LERER 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nanotechnology continues to advance at a rapid pace, 
appearing in a growing number of consumer products and 
comprising an increasingly significant portion of the United 
States’ economy.  But for all their futuristic promise, some forms 
of nanotechnology pose an environmental health threat, and have 
been linked to lung cancer.  Despite the real risk of harm, no 
federal agency has adopted nanotechnology regulations to protect 
human health and the environment.  A diverse group of NGOs, 
academics, and community activists support expeditious 
regulation of the industry.  Industry insiders are also concerned 
by the slow progress of government oversight.  They fear that by 
not addressing environmental, health, and safety concerns, the 
public trust will erode to the point that the economic and social 
benefits of nanotechnology are occluded. 
The City of Berkeley’s Engineered Nanoparticle Disclosure 
Ordinance (BENDO) is the first and only city policy regulating 
 
 Drew Lerer has worked at the intersection of environmental science, 
technology, and regulatory policy for over twelve years.  He holds a bachelor’s 
degree from the University of California at Berkeley in Environmental Science 
and a master’s degree from Yale University in Environmental Management.  He 
has written regulatory policy for the State of California and the City of Berkeley 
and has been interviewed by National Public Radio’s Living on Earth, Pacifica 
Radio’s Against the Grain and Yale Center for Business and the Environment. 
He may be contacted at drewlerer@gmail.com. 
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nanotechnology in the nation.1  The BENDO follows a 
transparency model requiring nanoparticle manufacturers and 
handlers to disclose toxicological, environmental, and safety 
information to the City’s Toxics Management Division.2  If 
expanded to the state or national level, this model could be used 
to create a uniform nanotechnology regulatory policy.3 
The purpose of this article is threefold.  First, a practical 
ideal model of a nanotechnology disclosure policy is developed 
based on relevant literature.  Second, the BENDO is assessed 
using the practical ideal type characteristics.  Finally, 
recommendations to improve the BENDO are presented based on 
the assessment. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Nanotechnology is the creation of structures of the size of 100 
nanometers or smaller in any one dimension.4  For comparison, a 
hair is approximately 80,000 nanometers wide while a typical 
smallpox virus particle is roughly 300 nanometers in length.5  
Materials reduced to the nanoscale can display novel properties 
that are not present in the macroscale.6  For example, the same 
chemical composition of silicon can emit different colors of light 
depending upon its size.7  Nanotechnology’s novel properties offer 
many environmental and commercial benefits including: 
 
 1. See CITY OF BERKELEY, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 15.12.010–15.12.170 (2008), 
available at http://codepublishing.com/ca/berkeley/html/pdfs/Berkeley15.pdf. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Gary Marchant, Lincoln Professor of Emerging Tech., Law & Ethics, Ctr. 
for the Study of Law, Sci. & Tech., Sandra Day O’Connor Coll. of Law, Speech at 
Arizona State University: Emerging Technologies and the Environment (Sept. 
10, 2007). 
 4. Nat’l Nanotech. Initiative, What’s So Special about the Nanoscale?, 
NANO.GOV, http://www.nano.gov/nanotech-101/special (last visited Mar. 27, 
2013). 
 5. Nat’l Nanotech. Initiative, Size of the Nanoscale, NANO.GOV, 
http://www.nano.gov/nanotech-101/what/nano-size (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). 
 6. Nat’l Nanotech. Initiative, supra note 4. 
 7. Karlsruhe Inst. of Tech., Light From Silicon Nanocrystal LEDs, PHYS.ORG 
(Feb. 18, 2013), http://phys.org/news/2013-02-silicon-nanocrystal.html. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/6
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remediation of pollutants, solar energy technology, and the ability 
to make stronger, lighter, and more fuel efficient vehicles.8 
However, the benefits of nanotechnology do not come without 
risk.  Recent research shows that carbon nanotubes share 
carcinogenic properties with asbestos.9  Fullerenes, tiny 
structures of carbon that resemble soccer balls, have been shown 
to cause brain damage in aquatic animals.10  And quantum dots, 
that hold the promise of targeted delivery of medicine, also pose 
toxicological risks to human and environmental health.11  Novel 
properties also mean that parent materials cannot be relied upon 
to dictate the toxicological data of their nano-engineered 
counterparts.12  For example, while carbon nanotubes may 
increase the risk of mesothelioma, non-engineered carbon 
particulates of similar size do not pose a similar risk.13 
The White House describes nanotechnology as leading to the 
“next industrial revolution.”14  According to Lux Research, by the 
year 2014, 15% of all commercial products world-wide will 
incorporate nanotechnology with a combined economic value of 
over one trillion dollars.15  Unfortunately, research into the 
environmental and health effects of nanotechnology has not kept 
up with the growth of the commercial industry.  In 2005, through 
the National Nanotechnology Initiative, the U.S. Government 
 
 8. Nat’l Nanotech. Initiative, supra note 4. 
 9. Craig A. Poland et al., Carbon Nanotubes Introduced into the Abdominal 
Cavity of Mice Show Asbestos-like Pathogenicity in a Pilot Study, 3 NATURE 
NANOTECH. 423, 423 (2008). 
 10. Eva Oberdörster, Manufactured Nanomaterials (Fullerenes, C60) Induce 
Oxidative Stress in the Brain of Juvenile Largemouth Bass, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSP. 1058, 1058 (2004). 
 11. Ron Hardman, A Toxicologic Review of Quantum Dots: Toxicity Depends 
on Physicochemical and Environmental Factors 114 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 165, 
171 (2006). 
 12. Morteza Mahmoudi et al., Assessing the in vitro and in vivo toxicity of 
superparamagnetic iron oxide nanoparticles, 112 CHEM. REVS. 2323 (2011). 
 13. Poland et al., supra note 9, at 425. 
 14. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE—
LEADING TO THE NEXT INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, INTERAGENCY 46 (2011), available 
at http://www.ostp.gov/NSTC/html/iwgn/iwgn.fy01budsuppl/nni.pdf. 
 15. LUX RES., STATEMENT OF FINDINGS: SIZING NANOTECHNOLOGY'S VALUE 
CHAIN 1 (2004). 
3
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invested over one billion dollars in nanotechnology research with 
less than eleven million earmarked for risk related research.16 
The dearth of toxicological information and lack of standard 
risk assessment protocols make it difficult to determine the 
adverse effects of engineered nano-sized materials on biologic 
systems.  The large gaps in knowledge may be slowing down the 
regulatory process.17  As of 2006, an estimated 700 types of 
nanomaterials are being manufactured at about 800 facilities in 
the United States; yet, no agency has developed safety rules 
specific to nanomaterials.18  J. Clarence Davies, co-creator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has called for a new 
federal agency to conduct research and perform regulatory 
oversight of the nano-industry.19  He argues that the current 
federal regulatory agencies already “suffer from under-funding 
and bureaucratic ossification. . . .”20  “[Agencies] will require more 
than just increased funding and minor rule changes to deal 
adequately with the potential adverse effects of the new 
technologies . . . and many of these changes will take a decade or 
more to accomplish. . . .”21 
At the same time, local and state agencies are taking action 
now to fill in the gaps of nano oversight, as illustrated by the 
Woodrow Wilson Institute’s Project on Emerging Nanotechnology 
(PEN).  PEN’s Suellen Keiner writes that this bottom-up 
approach could serve as a “laboratory for democracy” by providing 
the federal government with a proof of concept for regulatory 
oversight.22  Local disclosure regulations could also provide data 
 
 16. ANDREW D. MAYNARD, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, A 
RESEARCH STRATEGY FOR ADDRESSING RISK 3 (2006), available at http://www. 
nanotechproject.org/ file_download/files/PEN3_Risk.pdf. 
 17. J. CLARENCE DAVIES, OVERSIGHT OF NEXT GENERATION NANOTECHNOLOGY 
13 (2008). 
 18. Christine M. Pense & Stephen H. Cutcliffe, Risky Talk: Framing the 
Analysis of the Social Implications of Nanotechnology, 27 BULL. SCI., TECH. & 
SOC’Y 349, 354 (2007). 
 19. DAVIES, supra note 17, at 3 (calling for “a new federal Department of 
Environmental and Consumer Protection”). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See generally SUELLEN KEINER, ROOM AT THE BOTTOM? POTENTIAL STATE 
AND LOCAL STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF 
NANOTECHNOLOGY (2008). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/6
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for environmental and safety standards as well as thresholds for 
nanoparticle toxicity exposure.  Keiner identifies California as 
being one of five states most able to launch initiatives for 
overseeing safe and responsible development of nanotechnology.23  
The Toxics Management Division (TMD) is the regulatory agency 
within the City of Berkeley that is responsible for implementation 
of the BENDO.24 
The BENDO, enacted in 2006, is the first law in the nation 
that addresses environmental health and safety issues related to 
nanotechnology.25  Based on its authority under Chapter 6.95 of 
the California Health and Safety Code,26 the Berkeley City 
Council amended its municipal code to require facilities that 
manufacture or use engineered nanoparticles to disclose 
toxicological as well as pollution and exposure prevention 
information.27 
Any facility that manufactures or handles nanomaterials is 
subject to the regulatory disclosure requirements.28  Retail 
businesses that sell consumer goods that contain nanomaterials 
are exempt from the regulatory requirement.29  Examples of 
consumers goods that may contain nanomaterials are ultra-light 
bicycle frames, titanium dioxide based sun screen, and odor 
eating socks that use nano-sized silver particles as anti-microbial 
agents.30  At the time the BENDO was enacted, there were only 
four facilities operating in Berkeley that manufactured 
nanoparticles.31  Two of the facilities, Bayer Healthcare 
Pharmaceuticals and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratories, 
 
 23. Id. at 8. 
 24. Id. at 21. 
 25. Javiera Barandiaran, The Berkeley City Ordinance on Nanotechnology: 
Shortcomings, Improvements, and Implications for Risk Governance 4 (Mar. 11, 
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://step.berkeley.edu/White 
_Paper/Barandiaran.pdf. 
 26. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 6.95 (West 2010). 
 27. KEINER, supra note 22, at 19. 
 28. Interview with Nabil Al-Hadithy, Sec’y, City of Berkeley Cmty. Envtl. 
Advisory Comm’n, in Berkeley, Cal. (June 4, 2010). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
5
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are among the largest employers in the City, with 1,500 and 
4,000 workers respectively.32 
The City does not provide forms or a template for businesses 
to fill out, nor does it specify the format in which information 
must be submitted.  The majority of submissions reviewed employ 
a narrative, business letter format.  Reporting requirements of 
the BENDO are categorized as follows: 
 
• Characterization: particle dimensions, mass, phase33 
• Toxicology: exposure pathways,  mutagenicity, 
bioaccumulation34 
• Occupational Safety: personal protective equipment, 
engineering controls, spill mitigation35 
 
The BENDO’s disclosure framework is unique—
distinguished from more traditional, command and control 
regulation—in several ways, as exemplified by the criterion set 
forth by Fung and O’Rourke.36  First, in contrast to setting and 
enforcing standards on nanotechnology producers, the BENDO 
primarily aims to provide private citizens, interest groups, and 
firms with relevant information related to production volume, life 
cycle, and environmental health and safety.37  Second, 
environmental requirements such as toxicological thresholds, 
exposure monitoring, and disposal analysis, are not initially 
determined by risk assessment and toxicological metrics; instead, 
the desired outcome of the BENDO is for firms to adopt 
environmental safety measures in response to a dynamic range of 
public pressures.38  Finally, rather than the creation of agency 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. CITY OF BERKELEY, CAL. TOXICS MGMT. DIV., MANUFACTURED NANOSCALE 
MATERIALS HEALTH & SAFETY DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/uploadedFiles/Planning_and_Development/Level_3
_-_Toxics/Nanoscale%20Reporting%20Guidelines%202011.pdf. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Archon Fung & Dara O'Rourke, Reinventing Environmental Regulation 
from the Grassroots Up: Explaining and Expanding the Success of the Toxics 
Release Inventory, 25 ENVTL. MGMT. 115 (1998). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/6
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standards or government sanctions, public pressure focuses on 
those who do not conform to the acceptable standard to induce 
them to adopt more effective environmental practices.39 
Disclosure laws, like those put forth in the BENDO, have 
notable benefits compared to coercive, command and control 
regulations.  For instance, they are relatively inexpensive to draft 
and implement.40  Furthermore, they can serve as vehicles for 
gathering data that can in turn inform the creation of 
environmental safety standards.41  Finally, the laws can 
simultaneously support the improvement of environmental 
quality and the democratic belief in the public’s right to know 
about environmental risks associated with the products and 
services they consume.42  This last point especially illustrates 
that disclosure laws are more politically feasible than coercive 
regulations.  However, there are also shortcomings to taking the 
disclosure law approach.  In the absence of effective planning, 
strategic execution, and sound politics, transparency’s 
effectiveness can be compromised.43  In addition, it can be 
challenging to measure the success or failure of disclosure laws.44 
Given the explosive economic growth projected for 
nanomaterials, manufacturers of nanomaterials have an 
economic incentive to protect their intellectual property related to 
their research and development while satisfying the information 
requirements of the BENDO.  The BENDO incorporates the trade 
secret protections mandated by the Hazardous Materials 
Reporting section of the California Health and Safety Code.45  
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Hua Wang, Environmental Information Disclosure, in GUIDANCE NOTES 
ON TOOLS FOR POLLUTION MANAGEMENT § 2.1.9, 5 (World Bank Grp. 2008). 
 41. Id. 
 42. David Weil, Professor, Bos. Univ. Sch. of Mgmt., Presentation at the 
Federal Trade Commission Conference on Consumer Information and the 
Mortgage Market: Promise and Pitfalls of Transparency: Insights for the 
Mortgage Market Crisis (May 29, 2008). 
 43. See generally RICARDO CRUZ PRIETO, TRANSATLANTIC CONFERENCE ON 
TRANSPARENCY RESEARCH, ON THE DISADVANTAGES OF TRANSPARENCY FOR 
GOVERNMENT: REFLECTIONS ON SOME ARGUMENTS AGAINST TRANSPARENCY AS A 
DEMOCRATIC REFORM STRATEGY (2012). 
 44. Fung & O’Rourke, supra note 36, at 123. 
 45. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25251–25257.1 (West 2012). 
7
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Information determined to be trade secrets is protected from 
public disclosure and required to be kept under lock and key.46 
III. ELEMENTS OF SUCCESSFUL TARGETED 
TRANSPARENCY 
This Section reviews the research of Archon Fung, Mary 
Graham, and David Weil on targeted transparency in order to 
construct a framework for evaluating the design and 
implementation of the BENDO.  This Section discusses the 
definition of targeted transparency, along with the benefits and 
risks of implementing a targeted transparency program.  Next, 
practical ideal type elements that are common to successful 
targeted transparency programs are identified.  This Section 
concludes with an operationalization table of the conceptual 
framework that will be used to assess the BENDO. 
A. Targeted Transparency: An Emerging Regulatory 
 Model 
Government transparency is essential to an informed 
citizenry and democracy.  The Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA)47 creates a broad statute for insuring openness in 
government.  Recent efforts have expanded the concept of sun 
lighting information and applied it to achieving more specific 
regulatory goals.48  The mandate to disclose information is no 
longer limited to government but extends to corporations and 
other organizations.49  The result of this evolution is what Archon 
Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil call “targeted 
transparency”—the use of publicly required disclosure of 
information in a standardized format to achieve a clear public 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 48. David Hess, Social Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The 
Prospects of Achieving Corporate Accountability Through Transparency, 17 BUS. 
L.Q. 453, 454 (2007), available at http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/dwhess/ 
Hess_BEQ%202007_Social%20Reporting%20and%20New%20Gov%20Reg.pdf. 
 49. Id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/6
  
2013] NANOTECH ORDINANCE EFFECTIVENESS 531 
 
purpose.50  Unlike the calls for transparency in all aspects of 
government, targeted transparency is grounded in the very 
selective disclosure of information from specific actors that are 
not necessarily limited to government. 
Targeted transparency is gaining popularity with policy 
makers for many reasons.  For one, it is cheaper and—
politically—less controversial than standards-based regulatory 
requirements.  It leverages the will of the citizenry rather than 
the government to achieve its objectives, thus responding to the 
growing criticism of the government’s ability to solve problems on 
its own with expensive funding or traditional regulation.  Finally, 
targeted transparency may be more easily applied to problems 
that cannot easily be defined, vary by locale, or are characterized 
by wide differences in concern amongst citizenry.51 
Since 1996, the federal government has adopted over 150 
targeted transparency policies to address such diverse concerns 
as SUV rollovers, public school performance, financial integrity of 
banks, worker safety, and environmental pollution.52  The 1984 
chemical release in Bhopal, India that killed thousands of people 
instigated U.S. Congress to pass the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA).53  Perhaps the 
most well-known of all of the environment targeted transparency 
laws, EPCRA supports emergency planning for state and local 
governments and provides citizenry and local governments with 
information concerning chemical hazards present in their 
community.54  The BENDO applies many of the same policy goals 
of EPCRA to nanoparticles. 
 
 50. ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE 
PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2007) [hereinafter FUNG ET AL.]; see also 
David Weil, Targeted Transparency, in ADVANCING EXCELLENCE AND PUBLIC 
TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 77, 77 (Cal Clark & Don-Terry Veal eds., 2011). 
 51. See generally FUNG ET AL., supra note 50. 
 52. Id. at 20. 
 53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2012); LINDA-JO SCHIEROW, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL 32683, THE EMERGENCY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW 
ACT (EPCRA): A SUMMARY 1 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
misc/RL32683.pdf. 
 54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050. 
9
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Targeted transparency considers two types of stakeholders: 
information disclosers and information users.55  Information 
disclosers are those required to provide information in the specific 
format that the policy dictates, and who policymakers target to 
effect behavioral change.56  Information users draw upon the 
information that they find relevant in an effort to inform their 
choices.57  The targeted transparency policy has an effect when 
the information enters the decision making process of users and 
influences their decisions.58  This in turn affects disclosure 
behavior in what Fung, Graham, and Weil term the “Action 
Cycle.”59 
In the case of the BENDO, there is a diverse group of both 
information disclosers and information users.  Since 
nanotechnology spans different industries, the BENDO disclosers 
include federal research laboratories, drug manufacturers, 
manufacturers of consumer cosmetics, and higher education 
institutions.60  Information users are also diverse, with different 
incentives for using information.  They include: emergency 
responders, toxic reduction advocacy groups, property 
speculators, neighborhood groups, and—because of the 
uniqueness of the ordinance itself—other policy makers, and 
policy researches.61  Thus, a diversity of interests is represented 
by each user.  The stakeholders in the City of Berkeley are 
largely representative of the state of California as a whole and 
perhaps the nation.  This is important when considering the 
feasibility of using the BENDO as a model for a larger audience. 
 
 55. David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25 J. 
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155, 156 (2005). 
 56. Id. at 157. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 158. 
 59. Archon Fung et al., The Political Economy of Transparency: What Makes 
Disclosure Policies Effective? 4 (Ash Inst. for Democratic Governance & 
Innovation, Working Paper No. 12, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=766287. 
 60. Interview with Nabil Al-Hadithy, supra note 28. 
 61. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/6
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B. Evaluating the BENDO: A Conceptual Framework 
Based on a review of the relevant literature, the conceptual 
framework used to evaluate the effectiveness of the BENDO 
consists of the following categories: 
 
  Extent to which policy fills an information gap62 
  Accuracy of information63 
  Cost and resources64 
  Enforcement65 
  User embeddedness66 
  Discloser embeddedness67 
  Feedback and evaluation mechanism68 
  Involvement of user groups69 
 Extent to which existing regulatory programs are      
leveraged70 
 
All elements of the framework identified above are taken 
from the literature.  The remainder of this section draws upon 
this literature to provide an examination and justification of the 
elements of a successful nanoparticle transparency policy. 
C. Extent to Which Policy Fills an Information Gap 
Before we can begin to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
BENDO, we must first establish whether the goals of the policy 
problem it seeks to address are compatible with targeted 
transparency.  Targeted transparency assumes that an 
information gap is somehow contributing to the regulatory 
 
 62. FUNG ET AL., supra note 50, at 174. 
 63. Id. at 178. 
 64. Edward P. Weber, Successful Collaboration: Negotiating Effective 
Regulations, 40 ENV’T: SCI. & POL’Y FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 11, 12 (1998). 
 65. FUNG ET AL., supra note 50, at 39. 
 66. Fung et al., supra note 59, at 10-13. 
 67. Id. at 13-15. 
 68. Id. at 20. 
 69. Id. at 7-9. 
 70. Weber, supra note 64, at 13. 
11
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problem.  In order for targeted transparency to be effective, the 
nature of the information gap should be known.71  One way to 
determine the nature of the information gap and its relation to 
risk is to perform a risk assessment.72  Thus, policymakers should 
ask how bridging the information gap reduces risk. 
D. Information Accuracy 
For information to be of value it must adhere to a standard of 
accuracy.73  There are four junctures where there are 
opportunities for data to become inaccurate.  The first is initial 
data entry.74  This can occur because of typos, poor data entry 
forms, or poor training of the data-entry staff.75  The second 
source of data inaccuracy, called “data movement,” is a result of 
mistakes made when extracting or loading data into a secondary 
data source.76  Many data entry errors occur when the initial data 
is entered on paper and then entered manually into a secondary 
computer database.77  The third source of inaccuracy is when 
data reports, spreadsheets, query results, or summaries are 
generated from the database.78  If the person extracting the 
information does not understand the data map, fields, and data 
dictionary then inaccurate information can be drawn from 
accurate data.79  Data decay occurs when data is not updated; 
data must be reviewed to ensure that it is accurate over time.80 
E. Costs and Resources 
For transparency policies to be sustainable they need to have 
a steady funding source, seeing as regulations that are 
underfunded tend to have higher rates of noncompliance than 
 
 71. FUNG ET AL., supra note 50, at 174. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 109. 
 74. JACK E. OLSON, DATA QUALITY: THE ACCURACY DIMENSION 34 (2002). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 52-62. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 50. 
 79. Id. 
 80. OLSON, supra note 74, at 50. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/6
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funded mandates.81  However, because estimating the costs of 
these policies can be difficult, fee schedules should be structured 
in a way that they can adapt to changes within the industry.82 
F. Enforcement 
Voluntary disclosure is only as good as the commitment of 
the disclosers because it requires no enforcement.  On the other 
hand, effective targeted transparency requires a robust 
enforcement program and the ability to levy sanctions against 
noncompliant parties.83  Enforcement actions should be 
publicized for maximum exposure and to act as a deterrent to 
noncompliant actors.  Enforcement that collects monetary 
penalties can also be used as a funding source to reduce costs. 
G. User Embeddedness 
Even if we assume that targeted transparency creates a new 
body of publicly accessible information, how the users make 
decisions with that information depends on a number of factors.  
When new information becomes part of a user’s decision making 
routing it becomes what Weil et al. calls “embedded.”84  According 
to Weil et al., the following three factors are key as to whether a 
transparency policy becomes embedded in user’s decision making 
routines: 
 
 The information’s perceived value in achieving user’s 
goals85 
 The information’s compatibility with user’s decision 
making routines86 
 The information’s comprehensibility87 
 
 
 81. James R. St. George, Unfunded Mandates: Balancing State and National 
Needs, 13 BROOKINGS REV. 12, 12-15 (1995). 
 82. Weil et al., supra note 55, at 156. 
 83. FUNG ET AL., supra note 50, at 45. 
 84. Weil et al., supra note 55, at 155-56. 
 85. Id. at 159-62. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
13
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How users value information depends on a number of 
dynamic factors.  Each user may determine the value of 
information differently and for different choices.88  For example, a 
new home buyer may use information based on the toxic release 
inventory to determine if there are polluters in his prospective 
neighborhood.  A local government agency may use the same 
information to amend zoning ordinances.  Someone who is not 
concerned about the effects of airborne contaminants on his or 
her health may not value the information at all. 
Similarly, additional information may not help users for 
whom there are limited choices available.89  An out-of-work 
factory worker may not have the luxury of changing jobs even if 
he is concerned about the level of chemical hazards present in his 
work place.  Affordable housing may only exist in areas where 
pollution emissions are high thus being the primary limiting 
factor of low-income home buyers.  The value of the information 
to these users would be low since it would not have much effect 
on their decision making process. 
In addition to information needing to be of value to users, it 
must also be compatible with the information user’s decision 
making routines.90  According to Fung, Graham, and Weil, 
compatibility consists of two components: format, and time and 
place of availability.91  Format can be used to mitigate complexity 
into a simpler system such as grading from A-F or a star rating 
system.92  Time and place of availability refers to where and 
when the information is accessible to users.93  The restaurant 
grading system of Los Angeles County serves as a prime example 
of having an easy to understand format and—by posting the 
grade on the restaurant window—the temporal and spatial 
availability of the system.94 
Value and compatibility are not always enough to ensure 
that information becomes embedded in user decisions.  If 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 173. 
 90. Weil et al., supra note 55, at 161. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 169. 
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information is not comprehensible users may not understand how 
to use it to their benefit.95  User groups, face a difficult balancing 
act between providing information that is too technical or too 
simplistic, since information that is too technical can exclude 
users who might otherwise benefit from the information and 
information that is too simplistic may leave out pertinent 
information.96  For instance, the Material Safety Data Sheets 
(MSDS) that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) requires be made available to workers are filled with 
technical jargon that the majority of workers do not 
understand.97  While OSHA requires that employers provide 
MSDSs to their employees, they do not require that their 
employees understand the MSDSs.98  In addition, OSHA does not 
require that chemical manufactures publish MSDSs with user 
comprehensibility in mind.99 
H. Disclosure Embeddedness 
Disclosers also have to be embedded in order for 
transparency policies to be most effective.  Even if transparency 
policies successfully change user decisions, for long-term 
sustainability, disclosers’ behavior must also be altered.100  Thus, 
the results of user decisions need to be communicated to the 
disclosers so that the users have the potential to change the 
behavior of the disclosers, in line with policy goals.101  In the case 
of the BENDO, it means that producers of nanotechnology—the 
disclosers—will take steps to reduce risks as a result of user 
decision making. 
 
 95. FUNG ET AL., supra note 50, at 59. 
 96. Id. at 59-60. 
 97. Weil et al., supra note 55, at 172. 
 98. Charles C. Phillips et al., The Efficacy of Material Safety Data Sheets and 
Worker Acceptability, 30 J. SAFETY RES. 113, 113-14 (1999). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Weil et al., supra note 55, at 161. 
 101. Id. 
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I. Feedback and Evaluation Mechanism 
In the current information age new metrics, benchmarks, and 
analysis are being produced at an exponential growing rate.  
Because transparency policies depend on the quality of the 
information they collect, they are prone to becoming outdated 
unless they are consistently reviewed, evaluated, and updated.102  
Therefore, effective policies tend to create requirements for 
frequent evaluation, feedback, and policy revision.103  This serves 
to not only promote adaptation to changing circumstances but 
also foster user and discloser participation by giving them a 
vested interest in the policy’s future.104 
J. Involvement of User Groups 
Transparency policies are strengthened when user groups 
take an active interest in supporting them.  By publicizing, 
translating, and promoting information exchange, user groups 
can compensate for weaknesses that may be inherent in the 
policy itself.105  The technical complexities of the MSDSs 
discussed earlier are often mitigated by labor unions that 
translate and disseminate hazardous chemical exposure 
information to their members.106  Though the Federal Toxic 
Release Inventory is difficult for lay people to understand, the 
data is routinely summarized and publicized by news media 
outlets and bloggers.107  Policy makers should be aware of the 
positive role of user groups and take steps to promote their 
involvement. 
 
 102. FUNG ET AL., supra note 50, at 176-77. 
 103. Id. at 179. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 177. 
 106. Phillips et al., supra note 98, at 113-14. 
 107. FUNG ET AL., supra note 50, at 162. 
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K. Extent to which Existing Regulatory Programs are 
 Leveraged 
Whenever possible, transparency policies should leverage 
existing programs to achieve policy goals.108  Existing programs 
economize staffing resources, fill in deficiencies such as 
enforcement and sanctions, and keep costs down.  The restaurant 
hygiene grading system of Los Angeles County would not work 
without a health inspection system, nor should it be thought of as 
a replacement for that system.109  Because targeted transparency 
is a complement and not a replacement for other forms of public 
intervention, it is important that they work in tandem with other 
government policies.110 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
This research draws on document analysis and structured 
interviews, using as a case study the BENDO regulatory process.  
A discussion of the documents and interviews used in the 
analysis follows.  The weaknesses of the study are discussed as 
well. 
The case study research method was used to assess the 
BENDO against a model program developed from reviewing the 
literature.  Robert K. Yin defines case study research as a 
“research strategy . . . used in many situations to contribute to 
our knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social, 
political, and related phenomena.”111  Case study was the 
preferred method of comparing the BENDO to an ideal model.  
According to Earl Babbie, triangulation involves “[t]he use of 
several different research methods to test the same finding. . . 
.”112  Triangulation is important because every method of 
research has strengths and weaknesses, which may have an 
 
 108. Telephone Interview with Archon Fung, Professor of Pub. Policy, John F. 
Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ. (Aug. 13, 2008). 
 109. Weil et al., supra note 55, at 169-70. 
 110. Id. at 169. 
 111. ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 1 (3d ed. 
2011). 
 112. EARL R. BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 118 (12th ed. 2010). 
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effect on the findings.113  Yin concurs that “[a]ny finding or 
conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more convincing 
and accurate if it is based on several different sources of 
information. . . .”114  In fact, triangulation is one of the strengths 
of case study research. 
Several data collection mechanisms were used in this study.  
First, focused interviews of users and disclosers elicited data on 
the BENDO.  Second, document analysis was conducted of the 
Berkeley Toxics Management’s policies and procedure manual, 
Community Environmental Advisory Commission (CEAC), and 
Berkeley City Council meeting minutes.  Finally, data from 
agency reports to California EPA (CUPA to state reports), agency 
self-audits, BENDO disclosure submissions, and Berkeley facility 
hazardous materials disclosures were used to supplement the 
focused interviews. 
Focused interviews both clarify information from the 
literature review and provide perspective on the roles of each 
actor.  Many interview questions pertained to the practical ideal 
elements of an effective transparency disclosure policy.  As 
established earlier, the ideal elements of a transparency 
disclosure policy come from the research of Archon Fung, Mary 
Graham, and David Weil of the Transparency Policy Project.  
Other elements were derived from the Project on Emerging 
Nanotechnologies (PEN). 
A. Operationalization 
Operationalizing links the practical ideal type categories to 
the data collection methods.  Table 1 indicates how the 
conceptual framework is linked to these data collection methods: 
document analysis, archival data, and focused interviews.  For 
example, the interview questions are constructed using the 
concepts found within the categories.115 
 
 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS 92 (2d ed. 
1994). 
 115. For focused interview instruments, see infra Appendix A and Appendix B. 
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Table 1: Operationalizing the Conceptual Framework 
Element Focused 
Interview 
Question 
Document 
Analysis 
Archival 
Data 
Extent to which policy 
fills an information gap 
A bridgeable 
information gap 
contributes to public 
risk 
Nature of information 
gap is known 
Bridging the 
information gap 
reduces risk 
A7, A8 CEAC 
Minutes 
 
Accuracy of information A35, A36 BENDO 
Regulatory 
Guidelines 
 
Cost and resources 
Cost is not prohibitive 
Agency has adequate 
resources 
Agency minimizes 
economic disincentives 
to disclosers 
A20, A21, B6 
A20, A21 
A30, B8 
 CUPA to 
State Reports 
Enforcement A18, A19 TMD Policies 
and 
Procedures 
CUPA to 
State Reports, 
Self-Audit 
User Embeddedness 
The information’s 
perceived value in 
achieving user goals 
The information’s 
compatibility with user 
decision making 
routines 
The information’s 
comprehensibility 
A6, A11-A16, 
A23, A24, 
A26 
CEAC 
Minutes 
City Council 
Minutes 
Self-Audit 
BENDO 
Submissions 
CUPA to 
State Reports 
Discloser A8, A38, B3,  CUPA to 
19
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Embeddedness 
Impact of user 
decisions on discloser 
goals 
Ability to discern 
changes in user 
behavior 
Information disclosers 
can reduce risks  
B8 State Reports, 
Self-Audit 
Evaluation Mechanism 
There is an evaluation 
process of the policy 
Results of evaluation 
are incorporated into 
policy 
A34 TMD Policies 
and 
Procedures 
 
Results strengthen user 
groups 
A33   
Policy leverages 
existing regulatory 
programs 
A3, A17 CEAC 
Minutes 
BENDO 
disclosure 
submittals 
Communication 
between regulators, 
users, and disclosers is 
practical 
A23, B5  CUPA to 
State Reports, 
Self Audit 
V. RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Through document analysis and focused interviews, this 
assessment reveals which elements of the practical ideal 
transparency policy model the BENDO is currently embracing, 
and which elements need to be implemented or improved upon. 
A. Extent to Which Policy Fills an Information Gap 
The City of Berkeley created the BENDO in direct response 
to the dearth of environmental health and safety information on 
engineered nanoparticles, a lack that was deemed as a risk to 
emergency responders and city planning decision makers.  The 
City conducted a comprehensive review of literature to evaluate 
this information gap and to determine the extent of the risk 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/6
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posed.116  Thus, the BENDO was implemented to fill this 
information gap and reduce the risks associate with the 
information gap.  Still, a weakness of the BENDO is that it only 
requires facilities to submit information that is known.  The 
BENDO regulatory guidelines suggest that facilities take a 
precautionary approach in regards to management of 
nanoengineered particles where health and safety information is 
not known.117  However, it does not require facilities to take 
specific action to conduct research to fill these information 
gaps.118 
To further strengthen the BENDO, TMD should incorporate 
an ongoing assessment of how the risk is being mitigated by the 
information that the BENDO provides. 
 
Table 2: Extent to Which Policy Fills an Information Gap 
Ideal Type Category Interview Document 
Analysis 
Summary 
Nature of information gap 
known 
Yes Yes City met with 
subject matter 
experts and 
conducted a 
literature 
review to 
determine 
nature of 
information gap 
and risk. 
Goals of policy problem 
consistent with targeted 
transparency.  
Yes Yes Purpose of the 
BENDO is to 
require 
disclosure of 
information. 
Recommendation: TMD should incorporate a regular 
assessment of how the risk is being mitigated by the BENDO. 
 
 116. Interview with Nabil Al-Hadithy, Sec’y, City of Berkeley Cmty. Envtl. 
Advisory Comm’n, in Berkeley, Cal. (Oct. 15, 2010). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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B. Information Accuracy 
BENDO submittals from facilities are stored in paper form in 
the TMD offices.  There is no translation of data from paper to 
electronic form.  TMD has not yet compiled the data in the 
submittals or created any reports that draw from the data.119 
 Although TMD reviews the BENDO submittal for 
completeness, it does not ensure that the data is accurate.120  
Part of the reason is that TMD staff do not have the technical 
expertise to verify the novel toxicological data.121  The other 
reason is that requiring facilities to report data significantly 
drains TMD’s resources.122  As the program matures, resources 
should be directed towards ensuring information accuracy at the 
facility level. 
 
Table 3: Information Accuracy 
Ideal Type Category Interview Document 
Analysis 
Summary 
Source Data No N/A TMD does not 
insure data 
accuracy at the 
facility level. 
Data Movement N/A N/A TMD does not 
move data to a 
secondary 
source. 
Data Reporting N/A N/A TMD does not 
create reports 
with data. 
Recommendation: BENDO should adopt a procedure for 
auditing facility submittals for information accuracy. 
 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Interview with Nabil Al-Hadithy, supra note 116. 
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C. Cost and Resources 
The BENDO is funded directly from facilities that engineer 
or handle engineered nanoparticles.  These fees are applied when 
the facility submits a disclosure document.  TMD staff bills the 
facility $150 an hour to review the submittal.123 
TMD has not recovered the money it invested in staff 
resources into implementation of the BENDO.  According to TMD 
financial records, approximately 400 billable hours were 
dedicated to the process of implementation.124  The City’s general 
fund paid for this effort.  TMD records also indicate that there is 
no money budgeted to support the BENDO beyond the hourly 
charge for BENDO data entry and administrative processes.125  
Furthermore, TMD’s Fee Schedule is approved by city council on 
a biannual basis.  Changes to the Fee Schedule can be made if 
they are approved by the City.126 
Bayer is one of the largest employers in Berkeley and the 
largest company that produces nanoparticles.127  In regards to 
discloser costs, Bayer’s costs have been minimal compared to the 
resources they spent on maintaining compliance with other 
regulatory programs.128  Mr. Bowman stated that approximately 
five hours of staff time was used creating the BENDO 
submittal.129 
Seeing as the BENDO needs a stable funding source to be 
successful into the future, TMD should perform a cost analysis to 
determine how sustainable the current funding mechanism is and 
whether it is sufficient for cost recovery. 
 
 123. CITY OF BERKELEY, CAL. TOXICS MGMT. DIV., CHAPTER D – CERTIFIED 
UNIFORM AGENCY: FEE SCHEDULE (2012), available at http://www.ci.berkeley. 
ca.us/uploadedFiles/Planning_and_Development/Level_3__Toxics/Fee%20Sched
ule(1).pdf. 
 124. Interview with Nabil Al-Hadithy, Sec’y, City of Berkeley Cmty. Envtl. 
Advisory Comm’n, in Berkeley, Cal. (Sept. 15, 2012). 
 125. City of Berkeley, Cal. Toxics Mgmt. Div., Toxics Management Division 
Budget (July 1, 2010) (on file with City of Berkeley, Cal. Toxics Management 
Division). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Telephone Interview with Geoff Bowman, Health & Safety Chief, Bayer 
Corp. (Sept. 29, 2012). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
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Table 4: Cost and Resources 
Ideal Type Category Interview Document 
Analysis 
Summary 
Steady Funding Source Somewhat Somewhat While TMD has 
a funding 
source for 
submittal 
reviews they 
rely on the 
City’s general 
fund to cover 
other program 
costs. 
Fees can change with 
industry 
Yes Yes Fee Schedule 
can  change if it 
is approved by 
city council 
Recommendation: TMD should perform a cost analysis to 
determine if the funding mechanism is sufficient for cost 
recovery and is sustainable.  
 
D. Enforcement 
TMD has a number of tools to enforce the BENDO.  As the 
BENDO is a city ordinance, violation of any provision of the city 
ordinance is subject to administrative citation.130  If a facility 
does not comply, it is sent a warning letter issuing a violation and 
a time frame for compliance.131  If the deadline passes, the facility 
is subject to an administrative citation with a penalty of up to 
$500 per day.132  The City Attorney is authorized to take further 
action such as revoking the facility’s zoning certificate or placing 
a lien on the property.133  In addition, the enforcement may be 
 
 130. Interview with Nabil Al-Hadithy, supra note 124. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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publicized through a press release based on the discretion of the 
TMD manager.134 
There have not been any cases of enforcement for 
noncompliance since the BENDO was enacted in 2006.135 
 
Table 5: Enforcement 
Ideal Type Category Interview Document 
Analysis 
Summary 
Robust Enforcement 
Program 
Yes Yes TMD has a 
robust 
enforcement 
policy with the 
ability to levy 
fines and revoke 
permits.  
Enforcement Actions 
Publicized 
Yes N/A Enforcement 
actions can be 
publicized 
through a press 
release. 
Recommendations: None 
 
E. User Embeddedness 
a. Information’s Perceived Value in Achieving User 
Goals 
The BENDO has a number of different users including policy 
analysts, academics, and the media.  These users are interested 
in the BENDO because it provides value as a case study for local 
nanoparticle regulatory efforts.  Berkeley citizens may take 
interest in the BENDO because of their concern for their health.  
Finally, City staff use the BENDO for city planning and 
emergency response decision making. 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. CITY OF BERKELEY, CAL. TOXICS MGMT. DIV., ENFORCEMENT CASES (2006-
2010) (on file with City of Berkeley, Cal. Toxics Management Division). 
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The document analysis reveals that lay people are not 
accessing the BENDO data as frequently as professional users.  
This suggests that the BENDO is not meeting the needs of the 
private citizenry, a user group to which the BENDO was designed 
to cater. 
 
Table 6: Public Record Reviews Berkeley BENDO 2006-2009136 
User Group Number of Requests 
Journalist 6 
Academic 13 
Public Agency 8 
Private Citizen 1 
 
b. Compatibility with User’s Decision-Making 
Routines 
Compatibility of information with user decision-making 
routines is determined by time and place.137  BENDO data is not 
electronic, as data is kept in TMD paper files.  A file review 
request must be submitted before the data can be retrieved.  Files 
are not available remotely and are not sent by fax or PDF to 
users.  TMD should consider making the information available 
online to users as this would reduce the time and cost to obtain 
this information and make it available to a larger audience. 
Furthermore, the data submissions are not standardized.  
The disparate format of the submittals makes it difficult to 
compare data.  TMD should either standardize submittals by 
providing a formatted template or synthesize data into a form 
that allows easy comparison of data. 
 
 136. CITY OF BERKELEY, CAL. TOXICS MGMT. DIV., BENDO RECORDS (2006-
2009), available at http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/uploadedFiles/Planning_and_ 
Development/Level_3_-_Toxics/File%20Review%20rev031912.pdf (providing the  
form to submit for public access to Toxics Management Division records, as 
reviewed by the author). 
 137. Weil et al., supra note 55, at 169. 
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c. Comprehensibility 
BENDO submittals are technical in nature, containing 
information on toxicology, engineering controls, and chemical 
properties.  While these submittals may be comprehensible to 
those with technical knowledge of nanotechnology, they may not 
be as comprehensible to lay users—such as citizens wanting to 
know the risks of living close to a facility that generates 
nanoparticles.  TMD should thus consider simplifying 
information or actively encouraging user groups who can provide 
this service. 
 
 
Table 7: User Embeddedness 
Ideal Type Category Interview Document 
Analysis 
Summary 
Information’s Perceived 
Value in Achieving User 
Goals 
 
Somewhat Somewhat It is likely that 
professional 
users achieve 
more value 
from BENDO 
data than lay 
persons.  
Compatibility with User’s 
Decision Making Routines 
 
No No BENDO’s data 
is not easy for 
users to access.  
Comprehensibility 
 
No No Data is not 
standardized. 
Recommendations: TMD should simplify and standardize 
BENDO data.  TMD should provide this information on the 
internet.  
 
F. Discloser Embeddedness 
Discloser embeddedness occurs when user decisions are 
communicated to disclosers, causing disclosers to adjust their 
27
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behavior.138  In the case of the BENDO, the desired behavioral 
change is risk reduction.  The media have played a role in 
broadcasting the BENDO to disclosers.  For instance, Bayer 
Corporation stated that it is affected by the media attention and 
has adjusted its practices accordingly.139  However, this is not a 
sustainable pathway of communication between users and 
disclosers.  TMD should provide a method for tracking user 
decisions and making this information available publically.  One 
such solution would be to solicit users to fill out a survey 
indicating their decisions and preferences. 
 
Table 8: Disclosure Embeddedness 
Ideal Type Category Interview Document 
Analysis 
Summary 
Disclosers have access to 
user decisions and alter 
behavior in response to 
user decisions. 
 
Somewhat N/A Media play a role 
in broadcasting 
BENDO to 
disclosers. 
BENDO does not 
provide a 
communication 
pathway for 
disclosers to 
access user 
decision making. 
Recommendation: TMD should solicit user decisions and make 
them publically available. 
 
G. Feedback and Evaluation Mechanism 
The BENDO lacks a formal evaluation formal feedback and 
evaluation mechanism.  Neither users nor disclosers are solicited 
for feedback.  In addition the BENDO has not been formally 
reviewed and evaluated since its inception in 2006.  TMD should 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Telephone Interview with Geoff Bowman, supra note 127. 
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implement a formal feedback and evaluation mechanism and use 
it to inform policy revisions. 
 
Table 9: Feedback and Evaluation Method 
Ideal Type Category Interview Document 
Analysis 
Summary 
Feedback solicited from 
Disclosers and Users 
No No TMD has no 
feedback 
mechanism for 
the BENDO 
Policy is internally 
reviewed and revised 
No No TMD has no 
review 
mechanism for 
the BENDO 
Recommendation: TMD should implement a feedback and 
evaluation mechanism to inform policy revisions to the BENDO. 
 
H. Involvement of User Groups 
The BENDO has attracted the attention of academics, 
national media, and scholarly institutes.  These user groups have 
helped to publicize the BENDO and bring it to the attention of 
the regulated community and concerned citizenry.  TMD 
maintains contact with user groups such as the Woodrow Wilson 
Institute’s Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies (PEN), and the 
University of San Francisco’s Program on Reproductive Health 
and the Environment.140  Although these groups have been 
concerned with the BENDO’s implications as a regulatory policy, 
they have not been involved in translating the data that the 
BENDO has collected.141  Although the BENDO regulatory policy 
has been publicized, the facility submittals have not been 
simplified or synthesized.142  Hence, TMD should solicit user 
groups who can simplify and distribute such data to the public. 
 
 
 140. Interview with Nabil Al-Hadithy, supra note 116. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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Table 10: Involvement of User Groups 
Ideal Type Category Interview Document 
Analysis 
Summary 
User Groups are 
supported  
Yes N/A BENDO 
conducts 
outreach and 
works 
cooperatively 
with user 
groups.  
Policy is publicized Yes Yes BENDO is 
widely 
publicized by 
user groups. 
Complex data is 
translated 
No N/A No data has 
been translated 
by user groups. 
Recommendation: TMD should solicit and create relationships 
with user groups that have experience simplifying data for the 
general public. 
 
I. Extent to Which Existing Regulatory Programs are 
 Leveraged 
TMD implements a number of environmental programs.  As a 
certified unified program agency, TMD is responsible for 
regulating facilities that handle hazardous materials and 
hazardous waste.  All of the facilities regulated by the BENDO 
are also permitted for managing hazardous materials or 
hazardous waste.  Because of this overlap, TMD leverages its 
environmental programs to support the BENDO.  TMD saves 
resources, called unified inspection, by conducting simultaneous 
inspections at facilities for all of the programs it regulates; the 
BENDO is incorporated into this inspection process.  The City’s 
administrative enforcement process described earlier is another 
example of how the BENDO leverages other environmental 
programs. 
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Table 11: Extent to Which Other Regulatory are Leveraged 
Ideal Type Category Interview Document 
Analysis 
Summary 
Existing regulatory 
programs are leveraged 
Yes Yes CUPA programs 
are leveraged  
Leveraged programs fill 
deficiencies 
Yes Yes Administrative 
Enforcement 
program is 
leveraged.  
Leveraged programs 
save resources 
Yes Yes Staff resources 
are saved by 
conducting 
unified 
inspections. 
Recommendations: none 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Overall, the BENDO has many elements of a practical ideal 
transparency policy.  In order to fully implement a successful 
transparency policy model, the City of Berkeley should focus on 
creating a formalized and standardized approach to correcting the 
deficiencies identified in this study.  
31
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APPENDIX A 
Instrument A: Focused Interview Questions 
For City of Berkeley Government Agencies 
Interviewee(s) Identified: Nabil Al-Hadithy 
City of Berkeley Toxics Management Manager 
 
1. Please describe your institutional affiliation and the 
type of work that you do with your organization. 
2. Probe: How does nanotechnology fit into your work? 
3. How do you decide what constitutes a nanoparticle? 
4. Probe: Why should these materials should be 
disclosed? 
5. How important are existing government programs in 
determining how the regulation was implemented? 
For example, existing infrastructure, cooperation 
between regulatory agencies, state resources, etc.? 
6. How do you see government mandates, legal issues, or 
program requirements affecting what you can do? 
7. What is your regulatory authority? 
8. Do you offer any interpretation of what the data might 
mean to the end user?  Please describe. 
9. Describe the reasons for instituting the BENDO. 
10. Probe: Did the lack of currently available information 
on nanotechnology constitute a public risk? 
11. How does the BENDO mitigate this risk? 
12. Describe the review and approval process once the 
disclosure report is received. 
13. Are variable results acceptable? 
14. What are the mechanisms by which end-users access 
information? 
15. How many information requests have you had since 
the regulation was enacted? 
16. How many information requests do you receive in a 
month, in a year? 
17. What percentage of information requests come from 
individuals, NGOs, consultants, litigators, etc.? 
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18. How long does it take end users to receive information 
once requested? 
19. How are requests for information processed? 
20. How does the BENDO integrate other regulatory 
policies to achieve its desired outcome? 
21. How does the City of Berkeley Toxics Management 
Division (TMD) address non-compliance? 
22. What enforcement resources does TMD employ? 
23. How is the regulation funded? 
24. Is the funding sustainable? 
25. Who are the end users of the data/information? 
26. What impact do you think your disclosure policy has 
had on the public? What are the most important ways 
in which these studies get communicated to the 
public—through media, government outreach, NGO 
activities, etc.? 
27. Probe: Do you have an outreach program that informs 
the public how to access BENDO information? 
Explain. 
28. Who are the intended users? 
29. Probe: Do users have the will, capacity, and cognitive 
tools to improve their choices through BENDO 
information? Explain. 
30. How are disclosers identified? 
31. What is the relationship between the users and the 
disclosers? 
32. Probe: Explain how BENDO influences the decisions 
of users and disclosers in the following areas: 
a. Risk assessment 
b. Risk mitigation 
c. Commercial manufacturing 
d. Economic decisions 
33. Describe the methods of communication between the 
regulatory agency and the regulated community. 
34. How is outreach conducted to the regulatory 
community? 
35. How are trade secrets protected? 
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36. What is the security policy for confidential 
information? 
37. Probe: Describe other policies that minimize economic 
disincentives to disclosers. 
38. How does TMD insure that information is 
comprehensible to users? 
39. What is the role of intermediaries, if any? 
40. What user group(s) access the BENDO data? 
41. Probe: Does the BENDO data contribute to the goals 
of the user group(s)? Explain. 
42. Does TMD have a feedback and evaluation 
mechanism? Describe. 
43. What metrics are taken into account? 
44. How are metrics recorded? 
45. What types of data analysis is being conducted 
currently or will be conducted in the future? 
46. Has regulatory policy influenced behavioral changes 
in disclosers? Explain. 
47. That’s it for my questions.  Do you have anything to 
add or do you have any specific question for me? 
 
APPENDIX B 
Instrument B: Focused Interview Questions 
For Private Industry 
Interviewee(s) Identified: Geoff Bowman 
Bayer Corporation Health and Safety Chief 
 
1. Please describe your institutional affiliation and the 
type of work that you do with your organization. 
2. Probe: How does nanotechnology fit into your work? 
3. How do you see government mandates, legal issues, or 
program requirements affecting what you can do? 
4. Do you believe the BENDO will assist in risk 
assessment for the following end users?: 
a. The Government 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss2/6
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b. The Public 
5. What kind of influence, if any (and how much), do you 
think nanoparticle disclosure policy is having or will 
have on the production decisions of industry? 
6. Describe the methods of communication between you 
and the TMD. 
7. What costs does the BENDO impose? 
8. Do you have any concerns regarding trade secret 
information? Explain. 
9. Has your management of engineered nanoparticles 
changed as a result of the BENDO? Explain. 
10. Probe: In relation to risk reduction risks or improve 
performance? 
11. That’s it for my questions.  Do you have anything to 
add or do you have any specific question for me? 
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